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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
DELFIN E. ORT·EGA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case
No. 9709

PERRY A. T·HOMAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

ST'ATE!JIENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by plaintiff against defendant for
injuries sust~ned in an.automobile accident July 12, 1960,
at F·ifth West and North Temple Streets.~tn Salt ~ake
City, Utah.·
DI.SPOSITION IN T·HE LOWER -COURT. ·
Plaintiff was awarded judgment against defendant
in the sum of $20,000.00 upon the verdict of a jury. The
trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the trial court's order
denying a new trial.
1
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PRINCIPAL QUESTION PRESENTED
!:fay a trial court properly give a "formula" instruction concerning negligence of the defendant whi0h does
not truke into account the element of contributory negligence of the plaintiff when that issue is rightly raised
by the pleadings and the evidencef
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the morning of July 12, 1960, Perry A. Thomas
and his brother Larry Neil Thomas were returning from
a navy leave at their home in Englewood, Colorado, to
their ship the U. S. S. Midway, at anchor in Alameda,
California (T. 435,481). Delbe·rt Schuller, a shipmate, who
had accompanied Perry and Larry Thomas on leave at
the1ir home was a passenger (T. 481). Defendant Perry
A. Thomas was driving a 1952 F'ord sedan which was
pulling a 2 wheel 7' x 10' trailer ( T'. 437). Two motorcycles were secured in the trailer ( T. 437).
Defendant and his traveling companions entered
Salt Lake City via 2nd West Street (T. 438). The semaphore at the intersection of 2nd West and North Temple
was green ( T. 439). ..A. fter slowing his vehicle he completed a right turn and proceeded west on North Temple
Street. He slowed for a red light at the intersection of
3rd West and North Temple to approximately 8 mph.
and then proceeded as the light changed to green (T. 440).
As he crested the viaduct between Third and Fifth West,
traveling approximately 20-25 mph. (T. 441), he observed
the semaphore light on Fifth West to be red ( T. 442). He
decreased his speed and when approximately 75 feet from
2
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t lw intersection the light changed to green and he continued in to the intersection ( T. 443, 445). ~1r. Thomas
observed the Ortega automobile just before he entered
the intersection from the west and applied his brakes
but was unable to avoid a collision (T. 345-346). The front
of the Thomas vehic.le collided with the left rear of the
Ortega automobile.
There was physical evidence that defendant Thomas
had attempted to avoid the accident because skid marks
were in evidence (T. 108-112). The evidence· is conflicting as to which party had the right of way. The defendant told investigating officer, Oscar J. Henriksen, following the accident, that he had entered on the green
light ( T. 156). Witness Peggy Lynn Day indicated the
light was not green for Thomas (T. 182-193), and witness Joe E. Archibeque, who was following the Ortega
automobile testified that the semaphore light changed
from green to red at the moment of impact (T·. 208). A
witness and friend of the plaintiff, Robert Garcia, indicated that he could see the traffic light was green for
north and south bound traffic and red for east and west
bound traffic, when the impact occurred (T. 249, 260). He
later retracted his testimony concerning his ability to
see the color of the light in both directions (T. 405). Of
course, the plaintiff testified that a green light gave him
the right of way in the intersection.
Perry Thomas observed the semaphore light turn
green when he was approximately 75 feet north of the
intersection (T. 443). Larry Niel Thomas indicated that
although he did not observe the light prior to entering
3
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the intersection, that it was green in favor of Thorna8
immediately following the accident (T. 483).
In any event, a conflict of testimony was presented
as to which party was entitled to the right of way through
the intersecion. There was also evidence that Ortega had
ample time to bring his automobile to a stop or otherwise
avoid the accident. (T. 445-447).
As a result of the accident the plaintiff Ortega suffered bodily injury.
STATEMENT OF POINT'S
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO THE
JURY FOR CONSIDERATION A VERDICT-DIRECTING
(FORMULA) INSTRUCTION WHICH DID NOT TAKE INTO
ACCOUNT CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN DECLARING TO THE JURY THAT A POLICE OFFICER WAS AN EXPERT WITNESS.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO THE
JURY FOR CONSIDERATION A VERDICT-DIRECTING
(FORMULA) INSTRUCTION WHICH DID NOT TAKE INTO
ACCOUNT CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF.

The Court's instruction No. 12 is a formula instruction apparently based on Instruction No. 2.4, Jury Instruction Forms of Utah. The instruction as given is as
follows:
"INSTRUCTION NO. 12
"Before you can return the verdict for the
plaintiff you must find by a preponderance of
4
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the evidence that each of the following two propositions is true:
''Proposition No. 1: That the defendant was
negligent in the operation of his automobile before the impact in one or more of the following
particulars :
"(a) In driving too fast for existing conditions, or,
"(b) In failing to keep a proper lookout for
other vehicles, or
" (c) In failing to yield right-of-way, or
" (d) In failing to keep his vehicle under
proper control.
''Proposition No.2: That the said negligence
of the defendant, if any, was the proximate cause
of the occurrence.
''If you find that the two foregoing propositions are true, you should determine the damages
sustained by the plaintiff according to the instructions hereinafter given to you on that subject."
The instruction does not incorporate within its provisions the issue of contributory negligence. It directs
the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff simply upon
proof of defendant's negligence and proximate cause.
The instruction is in conflict with the court's instruction
No. 14 relating to contributory negligence, which is as
follows:
"INSTRUCTION NO. 14.
"Contributory negligence is negligence on the
part of a person injured, which, co-operating with
the negligence of another, assists in proximately
causing his own injury.
5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"One who is guilty of contributory negligence
may not recover from another for any injury
suffered, because, if both parties were at fault in
negligently causing an injury, the degree of negligence cannot be weighed by the jury.''
Instruction No. 12, when read with Instruction No.
14, has the effect of being confusing and misleading.
It is fundamental that an instruction must include
all of the conditions of recovery. The formula instruction
given was intended for use in personal injury cases when
contributory negligence is not an issue. The note following this instruction, Jury Instruction Forms, Utah, 13,
specifically limits its use as indicated:
''If contributory negligence is in issue, use
this instruction with Instruction No. 2.5."
Instruction 2.5 includes as part of the same instruction
the elements of contributory negligence. The same limitations are contained in the California forms after which
the Utah instructions were modeled. (See BAJI forms
112.1, 113, pp. 287' 288).
The pleadings and the pretrial order leave no doubt
that contributory negligence was an issue in the case.
The defendant had charged four separate grounds of
contributory negligence, which consisted of : ( 1) failure
to keep a proper lookout, (2) failure to ik:eep his car under
proper control, (3) failure to yield the right-of-way by
enterring the intersection against a red light, and ( 4) trave1ing too fast for existing conditions (R. 7). Testimony
supporting each of these claims of contributory negligence was introduced by the defendant.
6
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Giving of a ~imilar fonnula instruction was held
t•rror in !vie v. Richardson, 9 Utah 2d 5, 11, 336 P.2d 781,
for the following reasons:
"The court gave this Instruction No. 4:
''If you find from a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant failed to keep and
maintain a proper lookout for the plaintiff in the
driveway where the accident occurred and that
such failure proximately resulted in the accident,
then your verdict must be in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.'
"The above instruction, taken by itself, is in
error because it fails to take into account the possible contributory negligence of the plaintiff. This
kind of instruction, sometimes referred to as a
'formula' instruction, which makes a recital in
accordance with the contention of a party and
ends with the conclusion:'* **and if you so find,
then your verdict must be for (the party) ' is not
generally a good type of instruction to give. This
is so because it lends itself to the error just noted
and also because it tends to be argumentative
rather than to set out the principles of law applicable to the issues impartially as to both parties. For such reasons it is better to avoid giving
instructions of that type. It is conceded that the
issue of contributory negligence was properly covered in the next instruction. This, however, pitted
one instruction against the other and might have
been confusing to the jury.'"
The Missouri court in Reari.ck vs. Manzella, 355 S.W.
2d 13±, 136 (~Jo.), used similar language in reversing a
jury award which was based upon a formula instruction:
7
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"It is here contended by defendant that the
trial court erred in giving plaintiff's verdict-directing Instruction No. 1 because it failed to refer
to or negative plaintiff's contributory negligence
submitted as a defense in defendant's Instruction
No. 7, 'there·by creating a conflict between the two
instructions'. In view of present controlling decisions it is our manifest duty to sustain the contention.''
A later instruction directing the jury to consider all instructions together was held insufficient to correct the
error.
The Supreme Court of New J\iexico similarly observed in McFatrvdge vs. Harlem Globe Trotters, 362
P.2d 918:
"There are innumerable cases holding that a
'formula' instruction must include each and every
element requisite to support a verdict, and that
omission of any of these elements can not be supplied by. reference to other instructions correctly
stating the law.''

See also Whaley vs. Crutchfield, 294 S.W. 2d 775
(Ark.).
In Beyerle v. Clift, (Calif.) 209 Pac. 1015, the California court reversed a judgment because a formula instruction did not include all conditions of recovery.
''The errors relied upon consist in the giving
of two instructions to the jury. In each of these
instructions the court stated certain provisions
of law defining the duties imposed upon an operator of .a vehicle, and then said:
" 'If, therefore, you believe that the defendant
violated any of the provisions of the law above
8
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mentioned at the time of the accident complained
of in this case, and that such violation was the
proximate cause of the accident, you should find
for the plaintiff.'
"Assuming that the issue of contributory
negligence was properly before the court, there
is no doubt that these were erroneous instructions, because it is settled law that, if an instruction by its terms purports to state the conditions
necessary to a verdict, it must state all those conditions and must not overloo!k pleaded defenses
on which substantial evidence has been introduced.
'''The court gave other instructions on the
subject of contributory negligence, the correctness
of which is not challenged. But this is not sufficient to overcome the prejudicial character of
the erroneous instructions.

" '* • • But the giving of these other instructions simply produced a clear conflict in the instructions given the jury by the court, and it is
impossible for us to say which instruction the
jury followed in arriving at a verdict in favor of
plaintiff.' Pierce v. United Gas & Elc. Co., supra,
161 Cal .at page 185, 118 Pac. at page 704."
Giving conflicting instructions or giving general instructions without regard to defendant's theory of defense was held to be reversible error in Morris on v.
Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772.
This Court has held that error arising from conflicting instructions is prejudicial and is not cured by other
correct instructions, because there is doubt whether the
jury followed the proper instruction or the rmproper
one. Sorensen v. B,ell, 51 Utah 262, 170 P. 72.
9
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Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines, 75 Utah 87, 283
Pac. 160 was reversed for a new trial for failure to instruct the jury in defendant's theory of contributory
negligence.
"A party is entitled to have his case submitted to the jury on the theory of his evidence
as well as upon the theory of the whole evidence.
Toone v. 0 'Neill Canst. Co., 40 Utah 265, 121
P. 10, Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 121, 124
P. 522, 523 and Miller v. Utah Consol. M. Co., et
al., 53 Utah 366, 178 P. 771; Pratt v. Utah Light
& Traction Co., 57 Utah 7, 169 P. 868.
"The following language of Mr. Justice
STRAUP in the case of H(J)rtley v. Salt Lake City,
supra, is peculiarly applicable here :
"'·There are two parties to a lawsuit. Each
on a submission of the case to the jury, is entitled to a submission of it on his theory and the
law in respect thereof. The defendant's theory
as to the cause of the accident is embodied in theproposed requests. There is some evidence, as we
have shown, to render them applicable to the
case. That is not disputed. We think the court's
refusal to charge substantially as requested was
error. That the ruling was prejudicial and works
a reversal of the judgment is self-evident and
unavoidable.' ''
See also Beckstrom v.
P.2d 309.

Will~ams,

3 Utah 2d 210, 282

The failure of the court to properly instruct the jury
on the question or contributory negligence in connection
with Instruction No 12 had the effect of failing to submit
the case to the jury on defendant's theory of the case.
10
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Sorensen vs. Bell, 51 Utah 262, 265, 266 170 P. 72,
reveals that the error which caused the Court to grant a
new trial was committed by giving a form instruction
very similar to Instruction No. 12, in the present case.
The condemned instruction read as follows :
"Unless you find from a preponderance of
the evidence that the alleged negligence of the
defendant actually existed and was the sole· proximate cause of the injury of the deceased, and
that the deceased, Hans Sorenson, was free from
any negligence or want of reasonable care proximately contributing to the injury, plaintiff is not
entitled to recover, and your verdict should be for
the defendant."
The instruction charged the jury that in order to
find for the plaintiff it must rind from a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant was negligent as alleged and such negligence was the sole proximate cause
of the injury, and that the deceased wa.s free from any
negligence or want of reasonable care proximately contributing to the injury. While the court observed that as
an abstract proposition of law the statement just quoted
1nay be correct, the language contained in the instruction
in effect charged the jury that "unless it appear from a
preponderance of the evidence . . . that the deceased
was free from any negligence or want of reasonable care''
the plaintiff could not recover. The court held that the
only:
" ... fair, natural, obvious and ordinary
meaning of the language contained in the foregoing instruction is that the jury were required
to find from a preponderance of the evidence that
11
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the deceased was free from negligence, etc. ; and,
unless they so found, plaintiffs could not recover."
The court then reversed the decision in this language·:
''True, counsel point to other portions of the
charge wherein, they contend, the rule respecting
the burden of proof is correctly stated. If that
be conceded, it does not minimize, much less cure,
the palpable error contained in the foregoing instruction. At most, it would merely present a case
where two instructions were given upon the same
subject, one proper and the other improper.
Where such is the case, the evidence is conflicting
upon the subject covered by the instructions, or
if such that more than one conclusion is permissible, and the record leaves it in doubt whether the
jury followed the instruction that is proper or the
one that is improper, then but one result is legally
permissible in this court, and that is to reverse
the judgment and grant a new trial to the aggrieved party . . . ·The instruction is therefore
clearly erroneous."
The Sorenson case, is an earlier and equally clear
statement supporting !vie v. Richardson, 9 Utah 2d5, 336
P.2d 781. An instruction which does not contain all
of the elements dealing with the particular proposition
under instruction, or is susceptible to more than one
conclusion, constitutes reversible error. Even though following instructions may properly define the issue in
question, such does not remedy the defect. The error
results from pitting one instruction against another,
which may confuse the jury.
In the instant case Instruction 12 was not only confusing but was in direct conflict with later instructions.
12
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\Vere the jury to follow one, it must of necessity ignore
another. The offending instruction in the instant case
violates the clear statement of Morrison v. Perry, 104
Utah 151, 140 P .2d 772, because the instruction as given,
did not "aJid the jury'' but could only mislead and confuse it."
In the case of Jensen v. Utah Railway Company, 72
Utah 366, 386, 270 P. 349, the Supreme Court condemned
the use of "formula" instructions which tend to apply
more general principles of law to a case without relating
them to the facts.
" The rule is well settled that ,in instructing
a jury, a mere abstract or general statement as
to the law should be avoided, and that all instructions should be applicable to evidence on either
one or the other of the respective theories of the
partie-s. Instructions which are not so applicable,
though abstractly they may be correct, are not
helpful to the jury, are apt to be misleading and
to be improperly applied. That a proposition may
be correct in a sense, and yet inapplicable to the
evidence or to the issue, is readily perceived.''
Complaint is not made _concerning the court's failure to substantially cover defendant's theory, but in failing to accurately instruct the jury concerning the interrelation of negligence and contributory negligence. The
mere fact that a later instruction mentioned the theory
is insufficient to correct that error:
"It is conceded that the issue ofcontributory
negligence was properly.covered in the next instruction. This, however, pitted one instruction
13
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against the other and might have been confusing
to the jury." Ivie v. R~cha~dson, 9 Utah 2d 5, 336
P.2d 781.

Clark v. Los Angeles-Salt Lake Railway Company,
73 Utah 486, 502, 508, 275 P. 582, declares the law with
reference to the type of error which must be committed
before a reversal will be granted.
"All committed errors, of course, are not presumpt!vely prejudicial, but, when the error is of
such nature or character as calculate,d to do harm,
prejudice will be presumed unt.il by the record iJt
is affirmatively shown that the error was not nor
could have been of harmful effect. Jensen v. Utah
Railway Company. 72 Utah 366, 270 P. 349." (Emphasis added.)
Obviously, all of the theories of the case cannot be
stated in one instruction and instructions which explain
a particular instruction are proper. In the rinstant case
the "natural and obvious meaning" of Instruction 12
could only lead to conflict and confusion with Instruction
14 dealing with contributory negligence, because they
were antagonistic to each other. To believe one was to
reject another. Thus, an irreconcilable conflict was presented to the jury.

A formula instruction as given in this case has been
condemned by this Court because it tends to pit one
instruction against another. That very thing occurred
in this case. The jury, after deliberating for some nine
hours, returned to the court to seek clarification of instructions Number 12 and 14. They could not reconcile
'14
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tlH'm. To have followed either instruction would have

been to disregard the other. The court then instructed
them as follows :
"The instructions you asked about do set out
the law applicable to the opposite theories of
each party. You should follow the instruction
which you think is supported by a preponderance
of the evidence.''
While the court inforn1ed the jury that each instruction set out the theory of the two parties, it did nothing
to clarify or to reconcile the obvious antagonism between
the two instructions. The jury was still faced with the
proposition of accepting one~ and rejecting the, other.
Had the instruction been properly given and contributory
negligence set forth as a part of Instruction 12, the jury
could have found that the defendant was negligent hut
the plaintiff was precluded from recovery by reason of
his contributory negligence. In following Instruction 12,
as the jury undoubtedly did in returning the verdict, it
was only necessary for them to find that the defendant
was negligent without considering whe~ther or not plaintiff's own negligence proxin1ately contributed to his own
injury. The so-called "clarifying instruction" did not
clarify. The irreconcilable conflict between the two instructions remained with resulting prejudicial confusion.
The jury was only plunged deeper into the knotty problem.
When an instruction is prejudicially erroneous on
its face a new trial is in order because the jury is presumed to follow the instructions of the court. The Su-

15
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preme Court in the case of Ry,an v. Beav.er County 82
Utah 27, 31, 21 P .2d 858, stated :
"The jury is bound, on questions of law, to
yield full obedience to the instructions of the
~ourt, and this applies as well to that part of the
charge defining the issues, as made by the pleadings, as to the law declared by the court, and made
appl~cable to the evidence as submitted.''
The following language of Mr. Justice Straup is
taken from the case of Jensen v. Ut,ah Railway Company,
72 Utah 366, 400, 270 P. 349, 362:
''However, where the committed error is of
such nature of character as calculated to do hann,
or on its face as having the natural tendency to
do so, prejudice will be presumed, until by the
record it is affirmatively shown that the error
was not or could not have been of harmful effect.
Thus, if the appellant shows committed error of
such nature or character, he, in the first instance,
has made a prima facie showing of prejudice.
The burden, or rather the duty of going forward,
is then cast on the respondent to show by the
record that the committed error was not, or could
not have been, of harmful effect." (Citing cases.)
Defendant has shown that the error complained of
was "calculated to do harm" and has established a prima
facie case of prejudice. He is entitled to new trial.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN DECLARING TO THE JURY THAT A POLICE OFFICER WAS AN EXPERT WITNESS.

During the course of the trial plaintiff produced as
a witness Police Officer and parttime student, Carl J.
16
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Nemelka (T. 101). Plaintiff's counsel put to him a series
of difficult questions in an attempt to interpret certa:in
skid marks and "veer marks", which appeared at the
scene. Defendant's attorney objected to the relevancy and
materiality of a particular qeustion with reference to
this subject and the following discussion occurred:

"MR. HANSON: Your Honor, I'm go~ng to
object to all this as being irrelevant, immaterial
and not based on any evidence in this case at all.
Certainly we are just speculating on things whiCh
have no connection on what was found out here at
this accident.
"THE COURT: The Court does believe that
this officer is an expert in his own sphere and I
have allowed him to testify as to the solid brake
marks prior to the change in direction. Mter that
point I don't believe this officer is trained to evaluate the evidence as he found it. He may testify
as to- I don't th~nk he's able to evalua.te it other
than a layman. (Emphasi~ added.)

"MR. KING: I wouldlike to- I differ with
the Court, of course, and I- would like to pursue
this to see whether he can or cannot apply the
same tables.
''MR. HANSON: Your Honor, may we approach the bench here for just a moment.
"THE COURT : There is a law question come
up, gentlemen of the jury, that we have to discuss
out of the presence of the jury, so we will take
the afternoon recess at this time. Again_the Court
must admonish you not to discuss this- with anybody else nor to form any opinions a_s to the final
disposition of this case or any part thereof.
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"This Court will be in recess for ten minutes.
" (Short recess.)
"DISCUSSION IN CHAMBERS''
'MR. HANSON: The defendant ecxepts to
the Court's statement to the jury that the Court
does believe that this off~cer is an expert in his
field, and with emphasis on the words 'does believe,' upon the ground and for the reason that it
in effect amounts to a comment on the officer's
credibility as a witness and also in effect amounts
to a comment on the evidence. That is, that the
Court told the jury that he felt that the officer
was an expert and that they should inferentially
give weigh to his testimony as an expert because
the Court felt he was one.
"MR. KING: Plaintiff responds to Defendant's exception by suggesting that the Court,
when the jury is recalled make a comment to the
jury that the Court was intending to discuss the
qualifications of Officer N emelka to go forward
and was not in any way intending to comment on
his qualifications in regard to what he has already
testified to nor attempting to comment on the
weight of the evidence. This I think would cure
any possible error just as a motion to strike, cure
possible error.
"MR. HANSON: Well, the Defendant objects to that suggestion upon the grounds that
that isn't what the Court intended to say or did
say at all. The court was commenting on the
weight to be given this man as an expert on things
he had already testified about.
"THE COURT: The Court didn't intend his
remarks to have that connotation, to have that
meaning or connotation to the jury.
"MR. HANSON: I don't question that. I'm
just thinking about the effect on this jury.
18
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"T liE COFH'r: YP:-;, but I think the Court at
this time could tell the jury that the Court was
ruling on the objection of Counsel as to allowing
this officer to go forward with his testimony in
connection with the· veer marks, and the Court
made the comment he did concerning him being
an expert up to a certain point; that the Court
did not intend that his testimony should be given
the weight of an expert or any way particularly,
but the Court did not intend any remark to indicate to the jury whether or not tbis"1\fR. HANSON: I couldn't object to that.
I don't :know whether it cures it or not, but I certainly couldn't object to it. I object to the connotation he has that you were talking about something he was going to say in fue future. You didn't
mean that at all. That was just Mr. King's idea.
That's not yours.

"THE COURT: I'll just ten them then the
remarks made in connection with the ruling of
this past objection as to his competency to testify
as to the veer marks, the Court did not intend
anything at that time to infer that the jury should
give any particular weight to this man's testimony, that it should he believed or not believed.
"!1:R. KING: Is that satisfactory, Mr. Hanson~

"MR. HANSON: No, I'll reserve my objection.
"THE CO"LTRT·: Sure.
AFT'ER RECESS
"(All parties present, the jury reseated in
the box, and the following proceedings were had:)
''THE COURT : Before proceeding with the
19
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testimony of this witness, the Court wants to advise the jury that a moment ago when the Court
was ruling on the objection of Mr. Hanson as to
the testimony of this witness with respect to the
physical factors occurring after the so-called veering of the wheel or brake marks started, the
Court in referring to the testimony previously
given by this witness and by referring to the witness as an expert did not in any way intend to
indicate to the jury what weight they would or
s!hould not or should devote or rely upon the
evidence of this witness. You may proceed." ('T.
133-136).
It is the contention of the defendant that the remarks
by the trial judge, wherein he stated that "the Court
does believe tha~ this officer is an expert" is violative
of Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. T!hat rule
precludes the court from commenting on the evidence
in the case. The rule merely reaffirms the common law
rul~ that a presiding judge at the trial of an action, may
not express or indicate, directly or indirectly, to the jury
or in their presence and hearing, any opinion as to the
credibility of the witness or of fhe evidence. 88 C.J.S.
Section 50 Sub. (c).
The annotator in 53 Am. Jur., Trial, Section 82,
sums up the law on this point as follows:
''The trial· judge should be careful not to express or intimate his opinion as to the credibility
of a witness; the jury are the sole judges of the
credibility of witnesses, and any comment by the
judge of this kind is evasive of their province."
This court has long observed this rule. In the case
of Hawley vs. Corey, 9 Utah 175, 33 P. 695, reversible
20
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error was found to exist where the trial court intimated
to the jury the weight of evidence which was to be given
particular testimony. The prohibition was to run against
evE-n impliedly intimating what the court's opinion may
be upon the facts.
The trial judge in stating his belief to the jury that
the plaintiff was an expert had the effect of commenting
upon the evidence. He stated without qualification his
opinion as to the credibility of the witness. This, of
course, would have the effect of advising the jury that
they were to give great importance to his testimony, and
was violative of this well recognized rule, State vs.
Green 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177. The remark had the further effect of emphasizing a part of the evidence, which
also is prohibited. J enk~ns vs. Stephens, 64 Utah 307,
231 P. 112. See also, State vs. Harris, 1 Utah 2d 182,
264 P.2d 284.

A.D. exception to the statement of the court was timely made. The court then attempted to correct any misimpression that may have occurred as a result of the
comment. However, the defendant's exception to the
original remark remained and the statement of the judge
resulted in no more than emphasizing the error that had
been committed.
As previously observed in the case of Clark vs. Los
.Angeles-Salt Lake Ra-ilway Company, 73 Utah 486, 275
P. 582, when an error is committed by the court, and is
of such character as ''calculated to harm, prejudice will
be presumed until by the record it is affirmatively shown
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that the error was not nor could have been a harmful
effect.''
It is submitted in the instant case that when the
prestige of a police officer is added to that of the court's
comment, that the officer was an expert, such is of a
nature "calculated to do harm". The defendant's rights
were substantially prejudiced by reason of such comment and is a sufficient basis for declaring a mistrial.
CONCLUSION
The defendant suffered material prejudice because
the court submitted to the jury for consideration a formula instrution which authorized recovery for defendant's negligence without taking into account the
contributory negligence of plaintiff. This error was compounded by the court improperly commenting on the
evidence in stating to the jury his belief that a police.
officer, one of plaintiff's witnesses, was an expert.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & BALDWIN
and MERLIN R. L YBBERT
Attorneys for Appellant
515 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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